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Thesis Summary
This thesis examines Japanese baseball and how the use of analytics and statistical
research has been implemented into Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB), compared to its North
American counterpart, Major League Baseball (MLB). Due to the large financial implications of
the MLB, teams have fully adopted the use of advanced metrics to find competitive disparities
and advantages in roster construction, game strategies, and player development. Because of the
long history attached to baseball in Japan, many cultural differences have adapted the game and
recently slowed the growth of sabermetrics. While the NPB is beginning to understand the
competitive value that analytics provide, the involvement of large conglomerates in the
ownership, operations, and governance of the league alter the considerations teams face when
implementing a research-based strategy. Because of this ownership structure, the true value of
statistical research is not entirely clear. How the teams, and corporations, choose to navigate this
phenomenon within the game will not only reveal the purpose of the franchises’ existence, but
also will affect the competitiveness, value, success of Nippon Professional Baseball as the 2nd
highest level of professional baseball in the world.
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Introduction
While historically considered “America’s National Pastime,” baseball has become an
increasingly international game. Major League Baseball, considered the highest level of
professional baseball in the world, had a player pool consisting of 28.4% foreign-born players on
2020 Opening Day rosters (“Opening Day Rosters,” 2020). This figure is higher than the
National Basketball Association, a league that has aggressively invested in expanding its global
presence, which has 23% of its players coming from abroad (Anderson, 2020). These players
represent 20 different countries; the majority come from the Caribbean and Central America,
where baseball is hugely popular, with others come from Asia and Europe (See Figures 1 & 2).
These countries contain their own top-level professional leagues where many of these
international players begin their career, namely the KBO League in Korea, the Dominican
Professional Baseball League in the Dominican Republic, the Mexican League and Mexican
Pacific League in Mexico, and Nippon Professional Baseball in Japan. From the highest level all
the way to the bottom, baseball has become an inherently international game with talent coming
from all over the globe. MLB teams have been forced to expand scouting footprints to capture
this growth and to compete with other teams and leagues for talent.
Along with international growth, MLB revenues and salaries are consistently increasing,
and the sport is more lucrative than ever. While the COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected
revenues for sports leagues worldwide in 2020, with fans not being able to attend games, the
MLB had a record $10.7 billion in revenue in 2019. This was the 17th consecutive year that the
league has seen record revenues, a trend that is expected to continue with the implementation of
new television deals (Brown, 2019). As revenues increase, players demand higher compensation.
Over the 40-year span from 1980 to 2020, the average MLB salary increased by 1,052%,
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adjusted for inflation (Anderson, 2020). Players have also been able to negotiate increasingly
larger contracts with multiple years of guaranteed money. Since 2015, there have been 6 free
agent contracts or extensions worth over $300 million, each with a span between 10 and 14 years
(Langs, 2021). The last 20 years have forced teams to consider the wisdom of tying themselves
down to giant, multi-year contracts, especially as players’ health, talent, and ability over time
continue to be factors. Further, teams must be able to supplement the expensive established talent
with young and inexpensive players whose ability is often difficult to predict. As a result of these
trends, teams have been forced to think differently about how they evaluate players, both in
terms of deciding who to award a large contract and the areas in which they can find value in
unproven players where other teams can’t.
Major League teams have implemented this historically unorthodox thinking with the use
of analytical tools and statistical analysis. Rather than basketball or soccer where players move
freely within a playing field with a set amount of time on the clock, baseball progresses based on
various events or outcomes. Players are delegated to a generally “fixed” position and each “play”
must be initiated with one specific player, the pitcher, throwing a pitch to one specific hitter. The
outcome-based nature of the game allows statistics to be more easily measured or tracked
relative to other sports. Additionally, baseball seasons are considerably longer than other sports
with each MLB team playing 162 games a year, providing very large amounts of available data.
Teams can analyze league-wide trends, create in-game strategic decision-making tools, project
overall team success, or develop the skillset of individual players, all using math and statistical
analysis. For example, the Houston Astros traded for Gerrit Cole, a statistically average pitcher
from the Pittsburgh Pirates, before the 2018 season. The Astros deduced from his data that he
would improve his pitching by increasing the spin rate on his fastball, throwing more pitches up
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in the strike-zone, and decreasing the overall number of fastballs he threw (Sawchik, 2019).
After implementing these minute changes in his pitching style, Cole established himself as one
of the league’s best and most dominant starting pitchers. In 2019, he went on to lead the
American League in earned run average and number of strikeouts and guide the team to the
World Series as the #1 pitcher in their rotation. That season, he finished second in voting for the
Cy Young award, an honor given to the best pitcher in each league. After the 2019 season, he
signed the largest free agent contract for a pitcher in history with the New York Yankees, a deal
worth $324 million over nine years (Hoch, 2019). The large amount of available data, combined
with various levels and types of analysis, create infinite opportunities for baseball teams to find
market inefficiencies and field the most competitive, cost efficient teams.
In Japan, baseball is the most popular sport with 42.8% of citizens claiming it as their
favorite (Chuo Research Inc., 2018). Japan’s national team, Samurai Japan, is currently ranked
number one in the World Baseball and Softball Confederation Rankings and won the 2019
Premier12 tournament against the other international teams ranked in the top 12. The country’s
top league, Nippon Professional Baseball, had an estimated total attendance of 26,536,962 in
2019 (“WBSC Rankings,” 2020; “観客動員数(2019 年),” 2021). This was second in the world
only to Major League Baseball in the U.S., which has almost three times as many teams and
longer seasons. The NPB is widely considered by scouts as “AAAA,” meaning the level of play
is not as high as what you would see in a typical MLB game, but is higher than the top minor
league in the U.S. with a “AAA” rating. The league is popular, and the level of play is high,
however analytics have not yet been widely accepted in Japan as they have in the U.S., with the
MLB having shifted to analytics-based scouting and strategy almost 20 years ago. While some
NPB teams have made significant steps towards implementing analytical research in their
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organizations, various cultural differences have stood in the way. This thesis seeks to explore the
reasons why Japanese teams have been slow to adapt, how analytics have been embraced thus
far, and important factors that teams must consider as the Japanese league’s use of analytical
strategies grows.

Baseball in Japan
Baseball has been a part of Japanese culture for almost 150 years. The game was first
brought to Japan during the Meiji Era in 1873 by English and American History teacher Horace
Wilson. While teaching at Kaisei-ko, the modern-day University of Tokyo, he taught his students
the rules and fundamentals of baseball to give them more physical activity. Competitive games
were soon organized between classmates and teachers and the sport began to gain popularity in
Tokyo. High school and college teams were formed around the Tokyo area, with the first
professional team being formed in 1883 by a railway engineer named Hiroshi Hiraoka (Whiting,
1989).
In 1898, high schools and universities around the country began to quickly adopt the
game and create teams after the Ichiko School beat a team consisting entirely of Americans with
a score of 29 to 4 (Whiting, 1989). With regular competition, amateur baseball gained an
enormous following, entrenching itself in Japanese culture at the start of the 20th century.
Japan’s university students that adopted baseball enjoyed the game and went on to become
government and community leaders. This gave baseball popularity among the upper class and
provided a foundation for the game to be implemented professionally and grow (Ikei, 2000).
Although many independent clubs were taking shape in the early 20th century, no formal
professional league existed. However, in 1934, the Yomiuri Shimbun, a popular national
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newspaper, sponsored a team of Japanese “all-stars” to compete against a visiting American allstar team – that included Babe Ruth – in hopes of generating an increase in newspaper
circulation (Whiting, 1989). The visit proved widely successful, and the Yomiuri-sponsored team
remained together to form the modern-day Yomiuri Giants, who, based in Tokyo, are Japan’s
most popular team (Chuo Research Inc, 2018). Six other teams were created by 1936, thereby
establishing the Japanese Baseball League as the first professional baseball league in Japan. The
league continued to develop successfully until World War II. Many players left to fight in the
war, eventually causing the league to stop play for a year due to a lack of players.
Following the war, the post-war economic boom allowed the league to grow and become
what it is today. In 1950, the Japanese Baseball League was reorganized into the present-day
“Nippon Professional Baseball” league, with major corporations heavily investing in
professional teams. The new wide-spread use of the television allowed the league to take off and
gain a following nationwide (Whiting, 1989). Since the reorganization, NPB has produced many
talented players, some having successfully transferred to Major League Baseball in pursuit of
higher salary, wider fame, and heightened baseball performance. These players, like Ichiro
Suzuki, Hideki Matsui, and Hideo Nomo, have gone on to be modern-day Japanese cultural
icons.
The nature of the game of baseball is also very in line with Japanese culture and
character, providing reason as to why the game caught on and has remained a staple of Japanese
culture since its introduction. Baseball has a slow pace when compared with other American
sports. There is no predetermined clock or length of time, only a fixed number of innings – nine
– that only increases in the event of a tie. The progression of the game is largely dependent on
the rate in which the pitcher throws the ball to home plate and that in which a team accumulates
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players being called “out.” Therefore, the game moves at a pace that contains small breaks
between pitches, situations, and innings. The Japanese people are generally considered to have a
reactive culture, one characterized by attentive listeners that absorb information and take their
time to arrive at a conclusion or give a response. Robert Whiting, a writer and journalist who has
covered baseball in Japan for over 40 years, said, “The Japanese are extremely careful. They like
to fully discuss and analyze a problem before reaching a decision” (Whiting, 1989). The time
between pitches and innings allows for the discussion and strategic analysis of situations in order
to make good, rational decisions. The Japanese fans appreciate this aspect of the game and
consider it to be an important and exciting part. The game also falls in line with the importance
of the group and individual challenges or tests in Japanese culture. “When their teams clashed,
the excitement was over not only the battle between two teams, but also over the one-on-one
battle between individuals. For the fans, it was breathtaking, like watching a fight-to-the-death
sword duel in a samurai movie” (Ikei, 2000). These cultural values changed the game over time,
giving the country its own unique version and style of baseball.
Today, Nippon Professional Baseball is still Japan’s top professional baseball league,
with over $1.3 billion in revenue (“観客動員数(2019 年),” 2021). The league contains 12 teams
spread across 11 different prefectures, spanning the entire country with the Hokkaido NipponHam Fighters located in the northern Sapporo and the Fukuoka Softbank Hawks located in the
southern Fukuoka (See Figure 3). The 12 teams are divided into two leagues, the Central and the
Pacific, with six teams in each (See Figure 4). Similar to Major League Baseball, one league, the
Pacific, uses the designated hitter (where another player can hit in place of one of the players in
the field, typically the pitcher) while the other, the Central, does not. NPB teams play 143 regular
season games, 19 fewer than MLB, but the season still occurs over the same time period from
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April through September, with the postseason taking place in October. At the conclusion of the
regular season the top 3 teams from each league by record, compete in the Climax Series playoff
tournament. This tournament determines the two league champions that will meet in the Japan
Series, similar to the World Series of MLB, which determines the overall champion of the NPB
league. However, the NPB playoffs are different from the MLB in that the first-place finishers
from each league at the end of the regular season receive a first-round bye as well as a one-game
advantage in the second round (Ikei, 2000).
Both leagues also contain similar systems for player development and acquisition.
Professional teams hold an annual draft where they can fairly select and sign players from both
the high school and college level. These players can then be added directly to the team to
compete in the upcoming season or be placed in the minor leagues for further development.
Should the minor league players prove their ability to executives, they can then be called up to
join the top team at a later date.
While the NPB is the top professional league in Japan, the high school level competition
that provided the foundation for the growth of the sport and formation of a professional league
still remains prominent. Every year, two major high school tournaments receive national
attention and media coverage. The tournaments, known as “Koshien,” consist of local teams
from various prefectures, demonstrating the importance of baseball to the country at a
fundamental, grassroots level. People enjoy the narrative of their local team progressing through
each stage of the tournament and making a name for themselves on the national stage (Ikei,
2000). Baseball in the U.S. lacks this localized element of the game because it gained popularity
through professional leagues, not amateur ones.
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While MLB games will be played until a winner is decided, regardless of the time or
number of innings played, the NPB allows for ties games. In NPB, regular season games that are
tied after 12 innings, or those that reach a 3 and ½ hour time limit, end with both teams accepting
a draw. This difference is representative of how the game was adapted for Japanese taste as well
as innate cultural differences between the two countries. In a piece about American sports
leagues moving away from the possibility of ties, Frank Deford from Sports Illustrated wrote, “A
tie has no place in sports. It's like not finding out who is the ‘who’ in whodunit,” reflecting a
widely accepted sentiment among Americans that someone must be named a winner. Some
former Americans that played in Japan attribute the aspect of ties to the cultural custom of
“saving face,” arguing that Japanese players are content with ties because no one will go home a
loser (Whiting, 1989). However, Wayne Graczyk of the Japan Times offers a more pragmatic
reason, saying, “Because Japanese teams do not have their own private transportation, and fans
need to get home while the trains are still running, night games cannot go into the wee hours of
the following morning as they sometimes do in the major leagues.” Either way, the collectivist
ideas important in ensuring the game is practical for each party involved represent the influence
of each country’s culture on their version of baseball.

The Japanese Posting System
A critical component of the relationship between the MLB and NPB is the posting
system, which provides a framework under which NPB players that have not yet reached free
agency can move to the MLB and sign a new contract. Historically, Japanese players have had
little labor protection and working rights relative to their MLB counterparts, aligning with
Japan’s historically tough work culture. For example, the MLB and the Major League Baseball
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Players’ Association (MLBPA) entered the first ever collective bargaining agreement (CBA), in
any sports league, in 1968. This gave the players more leverage in contract negotiations and the
power was shared between both owners and players, unlike before (Snyder, 2009). The NPB has
no such agreement and a player’s salary is largely left at the mercy of ownership. The concept of
free agency, a player’s ability to negotiate a contract with any team, was not implemented into
Japanese baseball until 1993, 18 years after the MLB adopted it. Even then, MLB players reach
free agency after six years of major league service time, starting from the date of their major
league debut. NPB players don’t reach free agency until they accumulate nine years of service
time. (“Free Agency,” n.d.; “International Free Agency—Asia (Professional),” n.d.). Prior to
1993, players were expected to play for their team “for life,” a concept that comes from Japanese
corporate culture in which graduates are hired by large firms directly out of college with the
understanding they will be given lifetime job security in return for absolute commitment to the
company. Although this idea is beginning to be phased out in Japan, the underlying authority
employers have over their employees remains prevalent, even in baseball (Murakami, 2019).
Until the posting system was implemented in 1998, Japanese players had no freedom to
pursue greater compensation, competition, and exposure by moving to the MLB because of rules
related to contractual obligations in the U.S.-Japan Player Contract Agreement. Others had tried,
but none found success until Hideo Nomo moved to the Los Angeles Dodgers prior to the 1995
season. Nomo had a growing distaste for the Japanese style of practices that didn’t promote rest
and recovery for players. His manager, while playing for the Kintetsu Buffaloes, Keiishi Suzuki,
said, “The best way to cure a sore arm is to throw more” (Whiting, 2010). Nomo had previously
won the Pacific League MVP award and was confident in his ability to play in the MLB after
comparing himself to visiting MLB All-Star teams, so he expressed to his agent, Don Nomura,
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that he wanted to move. Nomura then found a loophole in the Japanese Uniform Players Contract
called the "voluntary retirement" clause, which ruled that a player who retired and wanted to
make a comeback had to play for his former team as long as he stayed in Japan. Under this
clause, Nomo could voluntarily retire from the NPB and then be free to negotiate and sign a
contract with an MLB team (Whiting, 2010). So, Nomo exercised this loophole to retire from the
NPB and sign with the Dodgers prior to the 1995 season, later going on to win MLB Rookie of
the Year (“Hideo Nomo Signs Three-Year Contract With Dodgers,” 1996).
After two similar instances of players escaping to the MLB, the commissioners of both
leagues agreed to establish a posting system, allowing players to move to the MLB and the
Japanese teams to receive compensation in the form of a posting fee. The Japanese teams argued
for this compensation in order to mitigate the loss of their most talented – and generally most
marketable – players to MLB teams with much larger payrolls and financial resources. While the
agreement has been modified over time, early iterations involved a bidding process in which
teams would blindly bid on players that were posted, without any knowledge of other team’s bids
and their amount. This would sometimes result in posting fees greater than $50 million (See
Figure 5). To avoid those high posting fees, an agreement negotiated prior to the 2013-2014
posting window included a maximum fee of $20 million. This was determined by the NPB team
to which the player had contractual rights and gave the player the opportunity to negotiate with
any MLB team willing to pay the fee (Corcoran, 2013). Under the current agreement, in effect
since the end of the 2018 MLB and NPB seasons, players can be posted during a window from
November 1st to December 5th. All 30 MLB teams then have the right to negotiate with the
posted player for 30 days after the initial posting date. If an agreement is not reached, the player
must return to his Japanese club and cannot be posted again until the next year’s posting
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window. If the player and an MLB team do reach an agreement, the NPB team will receive a
posting fee dependent on the amount of guaranteed money that player signs for. NPB teams will
receive 20% of the first $25 million, 17.5% of the next $25 million, and 15% of any amount in
excess of $50 million. For players that end up signing minor league contracts, the fee is 25%
regardless of the value (“Japanese Posting System,” n.d.).
This new system has significantly benefited both MLB teams and Japanese players
seeking new opportunities. The players have much more freedom in being able to negotiate with
any team instead of being restricted to joining whichever team placed the highest bid. By
calculating the fee as a percentage of the contract, rather than a flat fee, the cost of acquiring a
player is directly tied to his perceived value by the MLB team while the risk is lowered if that
player doesn’t perform as expected. For example, the Texas Rangers paid the Hokkaido NipponHam Fighters a posting fee of $51,703,411 for pitcher Yu Darvish in 2011, when the system
gave negotiation rights to the highest bidder (See Figure 6). The Rangers then signed him to sixyear contract worth $60 million, meaning the total cost of Darvish for six years of play amounted
to over $111 million. In 2018, after the current system came into effect, the Seattle Mariners paid
the Saitama Seibu Lions $10,275,000 for pitcher Yusei Kikuchi after signing him to a four-year,
$56 million deal. Although the size of the contracts was similar in terms of guaranteed money,
the posting fee for Kikuchi was roughly 20% of Darvish’s. When evaluating the cost of the
posting fee as a percentage of the total cost the team accrues by acquiring and signing a Japanese
player, this measure has seen a decreasing trend as a result of the new agreement (See Figure 7).
Under this system, MLB teams don’t need to risk as much in the sunk cost of a posting fee, and
the incentive is greater than ever to pursue Japanese talent.
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Growth of Sabermetrics in the United States
In the early 2000s, the Oakland Athletics became the first MLB team to widely, and
publicly, implement statistical analysis into their baseball strategy and the construction of its
roster, a concept known today as “sabermetrics.” As a team that had a significantly lower budget
than others like the New York Yankees or Boston Red Sox, they were forced to compete with
fewer resources and extract the most value they could out of their payroll. They did this using
statistical theories developed by Bill James. James, an average fan who spent his night shifts as a
security guard, wrote a series of abstracts that posed questions about baseball strategy and
attempted to answer them with objective data as opposed to subjective. James’ ideas and
reasoning directly contradicted the methods major league clubs used to evaluate players and
formulate strategy, subjective methods based on feeling, experience, and knowledge of the game.
James published his first abstract in 1977 and continued to publish other statistical works through
the 80s and 90s to little success. However, the A’s embraced his ideas roughly 25 years after his
first publication and implemented a strategy of signing players they believed were undervalued
to compete with the wealthier teams. Despite widespread ridicule from other scouts and teams,
the A’s qualified for the 2002 postseason after losing their 3 core players from previous seasons
to free agency. This qualification proved that success could be found using a statistics-based
strategy (Lewis, 2004). Bill James was later hired by the Boston Red Sox in 2003, who went on
to win the World Series in 2004 by constructing a bullpen of undervalued relief pitchers and
placing importance on the on-base percentage statistic, both suggestions from James (Goldman,
2005).
In the 15-20 years since the A’s Success, every major league team has implemented the
use of analytics into its operations in some form or another, and those that have fully embraced it
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have generally had more consistent success than others. The Houston Astros, the team that
developed Gerrit Cole into a pitcher the Yankees valued at $324 million as described earlier,
have become known as one of the most developed teams in statistical analysis. In 2011, the
Astros hired Jeff Lunhow as their new general manager. Lunhow was an executive responsible
for building the St. Louis Cardinals analytics department that helped them win the World Series
in 2011 and reach the playoffs each of the following four years. With the Astros, Lunhow spent
time developing the team’s analytics department and convincing the staff, scouts, coaches, and
players to buy in. Irving Wladawsky from the Wall Street Journal described the process after
interviewing Lunhow, “First, he had to get the player-acquisition decision makers to leverage
data to help them make better decisions. That was the relatively easier part. Much harder was
convincing the coaches and players across the Astros’ organization, including their extensive
minor leagues and player development system, to use all the available information in their everyday decisions, such as game-day lineups and defensive configurations. That took three to four
years of really hard work.” The process of overcoming deep-rooted strategic thinking was not a
rapid one, but eventually the Astros became one of the most forward-thinking organizations in
the MLB. From 2017 to 2020, the Astros reached four American League Championship Series,
won two of them to reach the World Series twice, and won the World Series in 2017. As of
February 2021, they have 44 employees in their baseball operations department alone, with 18
having the key word “R&D,” “analyst,” “analysis,” “developer,” “research,” “systems,” or
“information” in their job title (“Astros Front Office Directory,” n.d.).
While the Astros are one of the best teams at developing players through the use of
analytics, as they did with Cole, they are still a large-market team that has considerable resources
and the ability to sign expensive free-agents. Conversely, the Tampa Bay Rays have been noted
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as one of the best teams at finding value in unknown players; they have to in order to remain
competitive as a small-market team. Because the Rays cannot afford to be very active in the free
agent market like other teams with large payrolls, they rely on maintaining a talent pool full of
young, inexpensive players whose ability is identified through the use of analytics (Shaikin,
2020). Once their prospects prove themselves, they either leave for teams that can offer higher
compensation, or the Rays trade them for other young prospects that can replenish their talent
pool, much to the dismay of their few veteran players like Blake Snell (Bumbaca, 2019). This
strategy has brought the Rays success over the past few seasons, including a World Series
appearance in 2020, despite having the third lowest payroll in the league (Lee & Schoenfield,
2020).
The Los Angeles Dodgers are another example of an organization that has found success
after investing heavily in analytics. While they do have the ability to maintain one of the highest
payrolls in the MLB and spend large sums of money on top-level talent, like right fielder Mookie
Betts, they also have one of the largest departments dedicated to analytics in the league
(Verducci, 2020; Paine, 2020). According to their front office directory, they have 66 employees
in their baseball operations department, 22 of which have the same key words related to analytics
staff used for the Astros’ front office in their job title (“Front Office Directory, n.d.). One unique
caveat about the Dodgers is their ability to sign expensive free agents like the Astros, while
consistently replenishing their young talent pool like the Rays. They routinely acquire a large
number of young players to develop them, in hopes of a few eventually becoming top players
that can be brought up to the Major League level. Analytics are not only used for the Dodgers at
the top level, but throughout their entire farm system of minor league teams for development.
Neil Paine from statistical journal, FiveThirtyEight, stated “the beauty of these Dodgers is that
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they don’t exist in that continuum between contending and rebuilding. They rebuild and they
contend, all at once.” The Dodgers are using analytics to properly assign value to free agents,
develop players to be more competitive, and find younger, undervalued players all at once. This
core competency of the organization has permitted them to be a sustained, competitive
powerhouse in the National League, winning eight straight NL West Division titles, three of the
last four National League Championship Series, and the most recent World Series in 2020.
Although the Red Sox proved that teams could win a World Series with the use of
analytical methods in 2004, it took roughly another 15 years for teams to fully adapt and realize
success as a result. For perspective, the New York Mets were one of the last teams to invest
significantly in analytics. Kyle Newman, a writer for ESNY who is both a Mets fan and
statistical writer, wrote in October of 2020, “Advanced analytics never took off in Queens. The
Wilpons were vehemently against the idea of numbers controlling a baseball team. Despite calls
from the likes of Omar Minaya, Sandy Alderson, and Brodie Van Wagenen, they refused to
expand. As a result, the Mets now have the second smallest analytics department in MLB.”
However, this is beginning to change with new owner Steve Cohen, signified by four new jobs
posted on the Mets’ career and job openings page in February of 2021 that are analytical roles.
This 15-year time frame was partially due to ownership and personnel within teams
needing to accept the change and learn how to properly use the information to make better
decisions, but technology also played a role. What the A’s were doing in the early 2000s largely
used outcome-based, box score data, like on-base percentage, to project overall trends over the
course of the season. Now that data-tracking systems like Statcast and TrackMan are widely
available, teams have much greater access to performance data. Lunhow of the Astros also said,
“Today, it’s completely different. We now have so much technology around the ballpark and

19

information about the trajectory of the ball, the physics of the bat swing, the physics and the
biomechanics of the pitcher’s delivery - so many components now that advanced sciences have
worked into our game. It’s, quite frankly, overwhelming in terms of the amount of information
that we have access to and intimidating to figure out how to analyze all that information, work
through it, and come up with the takeaways that will allow you to continue to do what we tried to
do back in 2003, which is to make better predictions about what players are going to do in the
future on the field” (Wladawsky, 2018). Information from Statcast, a system that reports
measurements from on-field action including exit velocity, launch angle, spin rate, and catch
probability, to name a few, was not available in every major league ballpark until 2015
(“Statcast,” n.d.; Chen, 2016). Now that more data than ever is widely available to every team,
every MLB club in 2021 has some form of an analytics department dedicated to statistical
research. Those that have the highest capability to extract meaning from it and find market
inefficiencies will likely see the most success.

Sabermetrics Come to Japan
The acceptance of analytics in Japan has followed a similar pattern to that in the MLB.
Robert Whiting describes Japanese baseball as “conservative” and “orthodox,” noting that "
It takes a while for new wrinkles from MLB to catch on in Japan.” Despite the growth in the
U.S., the value of sabermetrics wasn’t quickly accepted in Japan. A man named Yusuke Okada,
however, became fascinated in the application of statistics to baseball and decided to push for
more sabermetric analysis of the Japanese game, earning the moniker, the “Bill James of Japan.”
Okada, like James, was considered an outsider to the game; his first job out of school was at a
call center. After seeing the success of Hideo Nomo in the MLB, he became interested in
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American baseball and began reading statistical literature, including works published by James.
Books about sabermetrics, specifically, stood out because the math made it easier for him to
understand without any knowledge of English. Okada got his first job in baseball in the early
2000s working for Nippon TV, in a role charged with creating statistical graphics for NPB
broadcasts. However, there wasn’t much data available, and he often had to track metrics
himself. By 2006, he left Nippon TV to work for Data Stadium, a company that tracked and sold
pitch and batted ball data to NPB teams and media companies. However, those in leadership at
the company were not interested in expanding their service into one that offered statistical
analysis and research along with the data. Okada said, “I tried to explain the significance of
advanced research to my bosses at Data Stadium as well as people working for NPB clubs, but
they rarely listened to me. For about 10 years from 2002, no one tried to understand, or even
cared about sabermetrics. … I was rejected right away.” Unable to change Data Stadium, Okada
moved on and decided to start his own company in 2011, Deltagraphs. Able to collect the data he
wanted, Okada hoped to prove the value of sabermetrics to NPB teams (Lindbergh, 2017b).
Deltagraphs is a website comparable to Fangraphs in the U.S., which is a baseball
database, journal for statistical research and news articles, and general hub for those interested in
sabermetrics. The site’s initial goal was to heighten awareness of analytics in Japan and grow the
community of sabermetric researchers. What is different about Deltagraphs, however, is that the
company also provides a service in the form of statistical consulting. They provide research and
strategic recommendations to NPB teams as they only have one or two employees dedicated to
research, if any at all. This began in 2012 when the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles asked him to
help create a “strategy and analytics” department within the organization. The team received a
new team president, who didn’t have a background in baseball and was receptive to Okada’s
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ideas. Okada said, describing meetings during the 2013 season, “It became clear that the
manager agreed with my thoughts on the team’s weakness. The team climbed up the standings as
he fixed the problem." The team went on to win the Japan Series later that year and solidified the
new analytics department as a permanent aspect of the team (Lindbergh, 2017b). Even with the
success of the 2013 Golden Eagles, it took Okada a few years to convince NPB teams of his
value. In an October 2019 interview with Yoshiki Masaki, an employee at Deltagraphs, he noted
that roughly half of NPB’s 12 teams use Deltagraphs’ consulting services, six years after Tohoku
Rakuten’s championship (Y. Masaki, personal communication, October 31, 2019).

Japanese Culture and Sabermetric Growth
In the same way that it was difficult for coaches in the U.S. to understand the value of
implementing statistical research into their gameday decisions, Okada faced difficulty in
persuading coaches and executives to use sabermetrics. He said, “When I was set to have a
meeting with an NPB club, their baseball operations person, who was a former player, yelled at
me. He said, ‘What are you doing here? You didn’t play at the professional level. Go home!’”
(Lindbergh, 2017b). The coach’s reaction stemmed from a long-standing facet of Japanese
culture: the “Senpai-Kouhai” relationship. “Senpai” translates to “senior” while “Kouhai”
translates to “junior,” although the Japanese definition of this relationship is based on when a
person, either earlier or later, joins an organization relative to the other. “Both Senpai and
Kouhai are relative terms since both are based on comparisons of status, skills, age, and time of
entrance into a group. In other words, Senpai exists only when there are Kouhai, and Kouhai
exists only when there are Senpai” (Sano, 2014). For someone not employed directly by the
team, especially one who never played or coached baseball, to suggest that a coach with decades
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of baseball experience should do something differently, was in direct violation of this cultural
custom. The Kouhai is supposed to follow and learn at all times, never questioning or doubting
the Senpai’s ability. Those with analyst roles in an organization are typically younger with a
degree related to programming or computing. In Japan, these younger people would be the last to
offer any advice or suggestions to someone in a position of authority with baseball experience.
“According to Guttridge, NPB teams still eschew infield shifts not because they aren’t aware that
the tactic exists, but because shifting would imply that previous managers who didn’t shift were
wrong not to have done so” (Lindbergh, 2017b). Despite the existence of a tactical advantage,
the cultural customs prevail and are placed above competitiveness.
This lack of competitive drive is also apparent in the ownership structure of NPB clubs.
For comparison, MLB teams are owned by individual owners or groups of owners known as a
“consortium.” The teams operate as their own entities, seeking to make a profit by selling tickets,
concessions, and merchandise, while also attempting to maximize their local television contracts.
These contracts represent how much a television network is willing to pay for the rights to
broadcast a team’s games. These contracts range from roughly $20 million a year all the way to
$250 million a year and represent a significant portion of a team’s revenue stream, roughly 60%
(Passan, 2020). Both the size of the TV contracts and the number of tickets sold are relatively
dependent on that team’s success and level and competitiveness. The more a team wins, the
higher their revenue will be. This makes the primary objective clear for MLB teams: construct
the best possible roster, within financial limitations, that gives the club the best chance of
winning.
This picture isn’t as clear in NPB as the clubs are owned by corporations rather than
independent owners. The teams operate as a subsidiary of that company, and even include the
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parent company’s name in their own (See Figure 8). This is why the Giants are the “Yomiuri
Giants” rather than the “Tokyo Giants,” and why the Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks have an “SB”
insignia on their hat rather than an “F” or “H.” The corporations run the clubs for the sole
purpose of marketing their brand. “Owners tend to put the clubs in the promotion department and
recognize that the main purpose of possession of the team is to promote the brand of products,
outstanding image of enterprise, and good public relations to the mass etc.” (Lee et al., 2010).
For these corporations, primetime TV advertising on a regular basis in Japan is far more costly
than running a baseball team that markets the company itself. Further, those in the top positions
of the front office running the club typically don’t have a baseball background and are simply
executives placed there from the parent company. “Whereas MLB general managers lie awake at
night thinking of ways to create a better team and increase profits, their Japanese counterparts
toss and turn at night scheming for transfers back to the parent company” (Whiting, 2007). This
makes it increasingly difficult to prove the value of analytics to ownership, even more so than
coaches given that they don’t prioritize winning.
The owners, to their credit, don’t have much incentive to invest in analytics as most NPB
teams don’t make a profit. “There are two teams that have historically done well. The Giants and
Tigers both draw 3 million fans a year and each are estimated to take in somewhere in the
neighborhood of 20 billion yen annually, the bulk of that in ticket sales and TV rights” (Whiting,
2007). Even then, those profits are directly remitted back to the parent company. The teams
themselves can’t reap the rewards from their own success and invest it back into the club. The
rest of the teams don’t even have earnings to remit, and their parent companies regularly provide
subsidies to keep them in operation. Much of their struggle is attributed to the significantly low
television deals relative to the MLB. “Whereas the Giants are able to sell their TV rights at a
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robust 100 million yen per game (and the Tigers around 50 million yen), the Dragons have to
settle for a rather low 10 million yen for most of their home games, Nippon Ham 3.8 million yen
and the Marines a piddling 150,000 yen” (Whiting, 2007). With TV revenues so low for most
teams, executives don’t have reason to spend resources on competitiveness, especially since the
teams will be bailed out by their parent companies regardless. The clubs serve their intended
purpose as marketing tools and, as long as the parent company prioritizes that strategy, this lack
of competitive spirit will not change, and investing in sabermetrics will not be a priority.

Japanese Analytics Today
Despite these barriers, the use of analytics in Japanese baseball has grown since Okada
got his foot in the door with the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles. This growth can be represented
by how many teams have a TrackMan radar system in their stadium. Though they might not be
able to extract value from the data immediately, the tracking of the data itself indicates that they
are moving in that direction. On TrackMan Baseball’s website, they claim that their system is
used by the “majority of teams in Japan.” Teams do not directly publicize whether or not they
use the system, so an exact number was determined based off of images uploaded to Google by
individual contributors (See Figures 9 through 9I). The TrackMan system resembling a black box
can be seen hanging above the stands behind home plate in 9 of the 12 NPB teams’ stadiums as
of January 2021. These systems appear to have been implemented gradually from 2016 through
2019, though the exact time frame of this is not certain as pictures of the specific area needed for
examination were not available for every month of every year. The fact that 75% of the league
now has access to batted ball data indicates that teams are beginning to transition to the use of
sabermetrics for their strategy.

25

One team, the Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks, has been noted as the team that has been most
receptive and progressive in the analytical movement by Yoshi Masaki from Deltagraphs (Y.
Masaki, personal communication, October 31, 2019). The Hawks are a client of Deltagraphs,
were one of the first few teams to install TrackMan, and have won the Japan Series in six out of
the last seven years, including four straight from 2017 through 2020. While other teams have
implemented TrackMan, the Hawks have likely benefitted the most as they can leverage core
competencies from their parent company related to information technology. SoftBank is
multinational conglomerate with subsidiaries involved in telecommunications, financial services,
and technology, and was the 66th largest company in the world according to the 2020 Forbes
2000 (“Corporate History,” 2020; Murphy et al., 2020). They are more likely to have existing
employees capable of quantitative analysis than teams like the Yomiuri Giants or Chunichi
Dragons, both of which are owned by large newspapers, the Yomiuri Shimbun and Chunichi
Shimbun, respectively (See Figure 8). While the team does have considerable resources and the
ability to sign expensive players, tit is also one of the few NPB teams with a 3rd farm team.
Fukuoka has significantly invested in expanding its developmental system, similar to the
Dodgers, in hopes of finding inexpensive talent that will turn into valuable NPB players. In 2016,
the team spent between ¥5 and ¥6 billion yen, roughly $60 million, on a brand-new farm system
base in Chikugo, Japan (Nagatsuka, 2018). According to an image from 2016 uploaded to
Google, the new main stadium even has TrackMan installed, indicating that the Hawks are not
just using sabermetrics to evaluate their NPB squad, but also to more effectively develop their
younger players. The head of Fukuoka’s Baseball Operations Unit, Sugihiko Mikasa, explained
outright that the club’s strategy is to accumulate as many young players as possible and have
them compete against one another for promotion, rather than relying on more traditional scouting
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methods that choose which players to develop subjectively. Mikasa said “If one player out of 10
gets promoted to the top team and does well, we can say our development is successful,” and “I
came from a non-baseball background, but I’ve heard scouts say, ‘this player is good, this player
isn’t, and things like that. But to me, there were just slight differences between those players. So,
we want to have many players and let them compete with each other” (Nagatsuka, 2018). This
system creates a pool of players that consistently produces talent capable of competing at the top
level, setting the club up for long-term success.
The SoftBank Hawks are embracing a strategy and way of thinking more similar to a
modern MLB team, rather than a traditional NPB one, and it is appearing to pay off. The team
had the third largest attendance in NPB in 2017, trailing only the Yomiuri Giants and Hanshin
Tigers, the only two profitable teams. The farm teams also drew 135,000 fans in 2017, almost
seven times as many two years prior. With their success, more fans are buying tickets and the
Hawks are bringing in more and more revenue. Although official figures are not publicly
available, Mikasa indicated the yearly turnover in 2017 was greater than ¥30 billion for the first
time ever (Nagatsuka, 2018). This growth can be expected to continue as the Hawks have created
a sustainable competitive advantage in their development and analytical approach, setting
themselves up to be regularly competitive in the future. If other clubs want to compete, they will
have to continue to invest in research and development and embrace the analytical movement as
the Hawks have. Otherwise, they will be left behind and remain uncompetitive.

Considerations as Sabermetrics Grow in Nippon Professional Baseball
As more Japanese teams adopt analytics-based strategy, the methods they use will have to
be adopted for the Japanese game. Okada from Deltagraphs said, “Basically, we replicate the

27

research done by American analysts and see if the same trend comes up or there’s a different
outcome. Since we are behind stateside analysis, we have to do it that way” (Lindbergh, 2017b).
While many trends from American baseball, like placing high value on batted ball exit speed for
instance, can be valued similarly in Japan, other trends and models won’t be directly applicable.
For example, many MLB teams use models on a macro, season long, level to project how many
wins they expect to need to make the playoffs, as well as how many runs they’ll need to score to
reach that number of wins. This analysis would have to be adapted to factor in the possibility of a
tie in the NPB. Similar models might also not be as accurate or reliable considering the NPB
plays fewer games in a season, resulting in lower amounts of available data. An accurate model
like this, however, would be more valuable in the NPB considering the possibility of a firstround bye and one-game advantage gained in the Climax Series if a team finishes with the best
regular season record. Adopting strategies used in the MLB is a good steppingstone as teams first
begin to implement analytics and learn the fundamentals of sabermetric approaches, however
they will eventually have to find their own inefficiencies, specific to the Japanese style of play,
that the other teams can’t easily replicate or copy.
One of the most notable plays in Japanese baseball that could change is the sacrifice bunt.
The bunt is widely perceived as the epitome of self-sacrifice in the game of baseball – giving up
the individual chance of success in order to provide a scoring opportunity for the team. Analytics
show that the bunt rarely, if at all, provides the best statistical advantage, and the MLB’s best
power hitters often play entire seasons without attempting a bunt. However, this trend has not yet
caught on in Japan as the importance of the sacrifice of the individual for team success is deeply
embedded in the culture. In 2017, NPB teams bunted 4.2 times the rate in which MLB teams
bunted (Lindbergh, 2017b). Whether or not teams overcome this cultural characteristic and the
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Japanese game sees a decrease in sacrifice bunts is yet to be seen, but can be expected as more
teams adhere to sabermetric advice.
Even then, moving away from the sacrifice bunt might not be in the interest of teams
given the abilities of the players. One player from the Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters named
Takuya Nakashima is viewed as a statistical embodiment of Japanese baseball. He hasn’t hit a
single home run, has a ground ball rate of 74.4%, and has a pull-rate of 16.2%. Most interesting
is that he led the league in sacrifices with 62, while the MLB leader the same year had 11. These
statistics are indicative of his strategy as a contact player that relies on his speed and putting the
ball in play, in any part of the field, hoping to simply get on base and give his team a chance to
score. He also led the league in foul balls, often having eight to ten-pitch at bats where he wears
down the pitcher and extends the game. A YouTube video documented a 12-pitch at bat in which
Nakashima fought off pitch after pitch and prolonged the at-bat, while the fans’ cheers and
excitement built throughout (See Figure 11). Despite managing a walk, the crowd roared as if he
had just hit an extra base hit. His other highlight videos are entirely made up of great defensive
plays, rather than other hitting highlights of home runs and extra base hits that are common for
the MLB’s best players. Nakashima is “one of the most popular players on the team” and was
even offered a roster spot on the Samurai Japan national team for the World Baseball Classic
(Lindbergh, 2017a).
If the NPB follows the MLB trend and decides to employ the sacrifice bunt less
frequently, the aesthetics of the game could be significantly affected, and it would have the
potential to be displeasing to the fans. For example, analytics showed that pitchers could be most
effective if brought in the game to face 1 specific hitter. The MLB game then experienced an
increased number of pitching substitutions, much to the fans’ dismay as it slowed the game
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down. To combat this, the MLB implemented a rule in 2020 stipulating that pitchers must face a
minimum of 3 batters in order to speed the game up (Petriello, 2019). NPB league officials will
have to be prepared to implement rules, dependent on how changes in competitive strategy
particular to the Japanese game affect viewing aesthetics, in order to keep the game appealing to
a Japanese fan base. Conversely, the league has a whole could disregard this analytic strategy
and continue to value players like Nakashima that are a better fit within the Japanese game. The
statistical evidence from NPB games could point to bunting being an effective way to score
considering the ability of Japanese players. In this situation, the analytical methods will have to
be adapted and teams will have to find a way to properly evaluate players with this skillset.
Regardless, teams will have to be prepared to find new methods of statistical analysis that fit the
Japanese style of play, and league officials will have to be prepared to implement new rules to
keep the game appealing to the Japanese market.
Another consideration the NPB will have to be aware of is the potential for a more active
posting system. As Japanese players are more thoroughly evaluated with batted ball data and
advanced metrics, MLB teams might be more inclined to invest in a posted player, especially
considering that the cost of doing so has decreased with the revised posting rules. With more
data available on players, teams can better project their success and the risk of spending money
on a posting fee is decreased. The consequence of this is that NPB teams will lose their best
players, who are often valuable marketing tools, reflecting why the posting system was
implemented in the first place. To fight this NPB teams could choose not to share their data with
MLB teams in hopes of protecting their best players and assets. They could focus on acquiring or
developing players like Nakashima that are statistically valuable to the Japanese game, that likely
wouldn’t be as valuable to MLB teams. An alternative strategy could embrace the transfer of
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their players to the major leagues. A Japanese team could focus on developing players with
skillsets that appeal to MLB teams like those with a lot of power and high exit velocities, capable
of hitting homeruns and extra-base hits. This value could be marketed to MLB teams with
statistical backing, and the NPB team could receive posting fees more frequently, potentially at
higher values, as more players are posted. By properly leveraging their data, Japanese players
could prove their value and ability with advanced metrics, and likely command higher long-term
contracts, consequently increasing the posting fee the NPB teams receive. While they would lose
their best players, teams could put their resources towards development, as the SoftBank Hawks
have, and create a talent pool of players that can replace those that depart for the major leagues,
or even more players with the potential of being posted. These earnings could also be remitted
back to the parent company, dependent on the strategy the team chooses, Players would advocate
for this, as for many, playing in the U.S. is their ultimate goal. “They are attracted to the higher
pay and prestige of the major leagues and eager to be free of the rigid Japanese style discipline
and the excessive practice of the Japanese system. As expatriate American pitcher Jeremy
Powell, who plays for the Softbank Hawks, puts it, ‘These guys can't wait to get to the States’”
(Whiting, 2008). Prior to the 2014 season, pitcher Masahiro Tanaka posted from the Rakuten
Golden Eagles to the New York Yankees for the max fee of $20,000,000 and agreed to a 7-year
deal worth $155,000,000 (See Figure 6). This is the highest amount of guaranteed money given
through the posting system and represents possible future contracts with lower posting fees.
While not every Japanese player can command a Tanaka-level contract, they can still expect to
earn more than staying in Japan with the MLB’s minimum salary in 2020 nearly four times
higher than the NPB’s (Allen, 2020; “Minimum Salary,” 2020).
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An argument against a more active posting system is that when popular NPB players
move to the MLB, NPB TV viewership declines as more Japanese fans choose to watch their
national heroes in morning MLB broadcasts over the NPB ones at night. Robert Whiting said in
an article for Time, “TV ratings for the Tokyo Giants, in particular, have fallen several
percentage points since live MLB casts became a regular morning affair in Japan.” For the
Japanese people, it is a sense of pride to have their players competing with the best in baseball’s
highest level. Prior to playing in 2018 season opening games at the Tokyo Dome against the
Oakland A’s, Yusei Kikuchi of the Seattle Mariners said, “In Japan, baseball culture is huge, and
they really respect the major leagues. I was one of those kids that always looked up to major
leaguers. I'm really excited for fans and for young players to look at major leaguers and ask
themselves, 'What do I have to do to get to this level?' I think it will be a great opportunity for
coaches, kids and fans just to see major league baseball. Just a great opportunity for them to be
there.” (Rivera, 2019). An anonymous Japanese official has differing views on MLB openers in
Japan, saying “Every time the MLB holds one of their openers in Japan, sales of our opening
week tickets go down.... We see more and more empty seats. It's not necessary for the big
leaguers to come here” (Whiting, 2008). While the fans love watching players like Ichiro Suzuki,
Masahiro Tanaka, and Kenta Maeda represent their country, NPB teams have historically viewed
the loss of their best players to the MLB as something harmful to the success of their league.
However, more Japanese players in the MLB could have a positive effect on the
popularity of the league. Out of the 288 foreign-born players on 2020 MLB opening day rosters,
only 9 were from Japan (“Opening Day Rosters,” 2020). A successful Japanese player in the
MLB could still be considered somewhat of a rarity, possibly explaining why MLB games are so
popular in Japan. If more Japanese players were posting regularly and this became less of an
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anomaly, the Japanese fans could be less likely to substitute the MLB for the NPB. If a player is
expected to be posted after the season, excitement builds around that player and fans could be
more likely to buy tickets and see him play before he departs. More Japanese players playing at
the highest level could increase national interest in the sport and be beneficial to the NPB in the
long run. Shohei Ohtani of the Los Angeles Angels, posted from the Nippon-Ham Fighters in
2017, views the MLB influence on the Japanese fans as a positive thing, saying “It's a pretty rare
opportunity for MLB games to be held in Japan, especially regular-season games -- and
especially with the Mariners and Ichiro and Kikuchi playing there, there is a lot of interest.
Hopefully for the Japanese people who are not baseball fans yet, it could lead them to become
baseball fans” (Rivera, 2018).
The NPB could also see growth comparable to Major League Soccer in the United States.
Once a league with relatively little popularity, the MLS has significantly improved its
development facilities and the league has expanded rapidly as soccer popularity grows in the
United States. The league is expecting to have 30 teams by 2022, up from 24 in 2019 (Young,
2020). United States Men’s National Team coach Craig Berhalter said, “The owners of MLS,
they invested a ton of money in youth academies, in facilities, in coaching, and now you’re
seeing the fruits of their labor” (Straus, 2020). The MLS is experiencing this growth and success,
despite the best U.S.-born players playing in Europe. Nine American-born players have played in
the 2020-2021 UEFA Champion’s League with a record seven players playing in the span of one
week in December 2020 (Goff, 2020; Karlsen, 2021). As potential soccer fans have seen U.S.
players competing at the highest level, they have become more interested in the game and Major
League Soccer has simultaneously become a fast-growing league with high potential for revenue
growth.
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While it can’t be assumed that more Japanese players in the MLB will have a similar
effect on the NPB, Japanese players at the highest levels could lead to overall growth. Teams
could benefit directly from more frequent and increased posting fees, and indirectly from more
excitement surrounding the sport, while maintaining a high level of play that fans would still be
interested in watching. Regardless of the outcome, NPB teams will have to consider how they
want to leverage their data in terms of their relationship with the MLB.

Conclusion
Sooner or later, NPB teams will have to decide what their primary objective is. Do they
serve only as a less expensive vehicle for advertising for their parent company? Or is their goal
to be a sports franchise capable of competing for championships? Such decisions call into
question the financial benefits of investing in sabermetric research. While most teams are now
tracking data with TrackMan, many are still learning how to analyze it. “But that doesn’t mean
that they know what to do with the data, in part because of the difficulty of finding analytical and
computer programming talents in Japan who are also well-versed in baseball. Programming
hasn’t been as widely accepted as a path to front offices as it has in the states, and teams are
often staffed with employees of their parent companies in temporary positions.” (Lindbergh,
2017b). Even if teams could find proper talent, it is expensive to pay salaries of full-time
researchers, especially when most of the clubs aren’t currently profitable. The financial benefits
of winning more games would have to outweigh the cost of hiring capable analysts. This is also
assuming that the parent companies feel they would benefit from their baseball team winning,
considering the recent financial woes and unprofitability of the league as a whole. It could be
argued that on-field success would in turn increase the value of both the baseball franchise and
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the parent company. As with the SoftBank Hawks, they have seen increased attendance due to
their success over the past decade. The popularity of the team has grown, providing more
exposure to the SoftBank brand. In 2020 the Pacific League, the SoftBank Hawks’ league even
agreed to a deal to broadcast games in the U.S. with the hopes growing league exposure and
interest, which gives the parent companies exposure to a large market outside of Japan (Coskrey,
2020).
The level in which teams invest in sabermetrics depends entirely on the purpose of the
teams in the eyes of their owners. Fukuoka has made it clear that they intend to win with the
investment in their farm system facilities and player development, as well as their
progressiveness in using analytics to gain an advantage. SoftBank appears to view the success of
the Hawks as a success for the company. While many teams are beginning to follow their lead,
whether it be through beginning to track data or using DeltaGraphs for consulting purposes, they
must do so fully with a commitment to make the team as competitive as possible. Otherwise, any
investment in sabermetric research without a full commitment to operate as a competitive
baseball franchise is not supporting the objective of the team as a marketing tool.
The growth of sabermetrics in Japan marks a turning point in the country’s baseball
culture, where the top professional teams of Nippon Professional Baseball will face strategic
decisions that will significantly alter the aesthetic and financial implications of the league.
Whether or not teams will fully embrace advanced analytics, as well as the different methods in
which they leverage their research, is yet to be seen. This transitional period will ultimately
reveal the parent corporations’ perception of their subsidiary baseball teams and the value they
bring.
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Appendix
Figure 1. MLB International Player Distribution by Country

International (Foreign-born) Players on 2020 MLB Opening
Day Rosters by Country (Excluding Inactive Status)
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Source: Opening Day rosters feature a record 291 internationally-born players. (2020, July 24). MLB. https://www.mlb.com/press-release/press-releasemlb-opening-day-rosters-record-internationally-born-players

Figure 2. MLB International Player Distribution by Region
Distribution of International (Foreign-born) Players on 2020 MLB
Opening Day Rosters by Region (Excluding Inactive Status)
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Figure 3. Map of Nippon Professional Baseball Teams Across Japan

Figure 4. Table of Nippon Professional Baseball Teams
Team
Chunichi Dragons
Hanshin Tigers
Hiroshima Toyo Carp
Tokyo Yakult Swallows
Yokohama DeNA BayStars
Yomiuri Giants
Chiba Lotte Marines
Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks
Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters
Orix Buffalos
Saitama Seibu Lions
Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles

City
Nagoya
Osaka (Nishinomiya)
Hiroshima
Tokyo (Shinjuku)
Yokohama
Tokyo (Bunkyō)
Chiba
Fukuoka
Sapporo
Osaka
Tokorozawa
Sendai
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League
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Central
Pacific
Pacific
Pacific
Pacific
Pacific
Pacific

Year Founded No. on Map
1936
8
1935
10
1950
11
1950
5
1949
7
1934
6
1949
4
1938
12
1945
1
1936
9
1950
3
2005
2

Figure 5. Table of Japanese Posting System History

Past Succesful and Unsuccesful Postings from NPB to MLB
Posting Date Player

NPB Team

MLB Team

Transfer Fee

Contract Agreement Date

Notes

Version 1: Blind Bidding System with No Maximum Fee; Team that Submitted Highest Bid Retained Exclusive Negotiation Rights
2/2/99
2/2/99

Alejandro Quezada
Timo Perez

Hiroshima Toyo Carp
Hiroshima Toyo Carp

Cincinnati Reds
none

$400,001

3/2/99 signed a minor league contract
re-signed with the Carp on February 3, 1999 for
¥34.5 million
11/30/00 agreed to a 3-year, $14 million contract
2/2/02 agreed to a 4-year, $12.3 million contract
signed with the Dragons on March 20, 2003 for
¥95 million
3/9/03 signed a minor league contract
12/10/03 agreed to a two-year, $1.8 million contract
2/3/05 signed a minor league contract
failed to draw any bids and was released by
Fighters on December 5, 2005; signed by the New
York Mets on January 18, 2006 to a one-year,
$750,000 contract

11/9/00
1/3/02
12/18/02

Ichiro Suzuki
Kazuhisa Ishii
Akinori Otsuka

Orix BlueWave
Tokyo Yakult Swallows
Osaka Kintetsu Buffaloes

Seattle Mariners
Los Angeles Dodgers
none

$13,125,000
$11,260,000

2/6/03
11/11/03
1/28/05
11/22/05

Ramon Ramirez
Akinori Otsuka
Norihiro Nakamura
Yusaku Iriki

Hiroshima Toyo Carp
Chunichi Dragons
Orix Buffaloes
Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters

New York Yankees
San Diego Padres
Los Angeles Dodgers
none

$300,500
$300,000
unknown

12/12/05
11/2/06
11/6/06
11/17/06
12/18/08

Shinji Mori
Daisuke Matsuzaka
Akinori Iwamura
Kei Igawa
Koji Mitsui

Saitama Seibu Lions
Saitama Seibu Lions
Tokyo Yakult Swallows
Hanshin Tigers
Saitama Seibu Lions

Tampa Bay Devil Rays
Boston Red Sox
Tampa Bay Devil Rays
New York Yankees
none

$1,000,000
$51,111,111.11
$4,500,000
$26,000,194

unknown
12/13/06
12/15/06
12/28/06

1/8/09

Koji Mitsui

Saitama Seibu Lions

none

11/2/10

Hisashi Iwakuma

Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles

Oakland Athletics

$19,100,000

11/15/10
11/23/11

Tsuyoshi Nishioka
Hiroki Sanada

Chiba Lotte Marines
Yokohama DeNA BayStars

Minnesota Twins
none

$5,329,000

11/23/11

Hiroyuki Nakajima

Saitama Seibu Lions

New York Yankees

$2,000,000

12/12/11
12/8/11

Norichika Aoki
Yu Darvish

Tokyo Yakult Swallows
Hokkaido Nippon Ham Fighters

Milwaukee Brewers
Texas Rangers

$2,500,000
$51,700,000

turned down a four-year, $15,250,000 contract to
remain with Rakuten
12/17/10 agreed to a three-year, $9.25 million contract
Failed to draw any bids from an MLB team, later
released by the BayStars
unable to reach agreement on a contract and
returned to Seibu
1/17/12 agreed to a two-year, $2.5 million contract
1/18/12 agreed to a six-year, $60 million contract

agreed to a two year, $1.3 million contract
agreed to a six-year, $52 million contract
agreed to a three-year, $7.7 million contract
agreed to a five-year, $20 million contract
failed to draw any bids from an MLB team, was reposted the next month
again failed to draw any bids, re-signed with the
Lions on January 20, 2009 to a one-year contract
for ¥57 million

Version 2: Fee Determined by NPB Team with a Maximum of $20,000,000 and Players' Ability to Negotiate with Any MLB Team
12/26/13
11/2/15

Masahiro Tanaka
Tony Barnette

Rakuten Golden Eagles
Tokyo Yakult Swallows

New York Yankees
none

$20,000,000

1/22/14 agreed to a seven-year, $155 million contract
failed to draw any bids from an MLB team; later
released by the Swallows; signed by the Texas
Rangers on December 15, 2015 to a two-year, $3.5
million contract

12/8/15

Kenta Maeda

Hiroshima Carp

Los Angeles Dodgers

$20,000,000

1/7/16 agreed to an eight-year contract worth a minimum
of $25 million and a maximum of $106.2 million

12/1/17

Shohei Ohtani

Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters Los Angeles Angels

$20,000,000

12/11/17

Kazuhisa Makita

Saitama Seibu Lions

$500,000

San Diego Padres

12/8/17 agreed to a bonus of $2.32 million and the major
league minimum salary ($545,000)
1/6/18 agreed to a two-year, $3.8 million contract

Version 3: Most Recent Agreement Implemented with Fee as a Percentage of Signed Contract
12/3/18

Yusei Kikuchi

11/19/19
12/3/19

12/3/19
11/26/20
12/7/20
12/7/20

Saitama Seibu Lions

Seattle Mariners

$10,275,000

Yoshitomo Tsutsugo Yokohama DeNA BayStars
Ryosuke Kikuchi
Hiroshima Toyo Carp

Tampa Bay Rays
none

$2,400,000

Shun Yamaguchi
Kohei Arihara
Haruki Nishikawa
Tomoyuki Sugano

Toronto Blue Jays
Texas Rangers
none
none

$1,200,000
$1,240,000

Yomiuri Giants
Nippon Ham Fighters
Nippon Ham Fighters
Yomiuri Giants

12/31/18 agreed to a four-year, $56 million contract with
options for up to three additional seasons
12/13/19 agreed to a four-year, $12 million contract
failed to secure a contract with any MLB team,
signed a 4-year contract extension with the Carp
on December 27, 2019 for ¥1.2 billion
12/17/19 agreed to a two-year, $6 million contract
12/25/20 agreed to a two-year, $6.2 million contract
failed to secure a contract with any MLB team
failed to secure a contract with any MLB team, resigned with the Giants
Source: Posting System. (2021, January 8). BaseballReference. https://www.baseballreference.com/bullpen/Posting_System

45

Figure 6. Table of Successful Japanese Postings to MLB
Successful Postings of Players that Received Major League Contracts
Player

Year
MLB Team
Posting Fee
Length of Contract in Years Size of Contract
Total Cost to Team Fee/Total Cost
Version 1: Blind Bidding System with No Maximum Fee; Team that Submitted Highest Bid Retained Exclusive Negotiation Rights
Ichiro Suzuki
2000
Seattle Mariners
$
13,125,000
3 $
14,000,000 $
27,125,000
48.39%
Kazuhisa Ishii
2002
Los Angeles Dodgers
$
11,260,000
4 $
12,300,000 $
23,560,000
47.79%
Akinori Otsuka
2003
San Diego Padres
$
300,000
2 $
1,800,000 $
2,100,000
14.29%
Shinji Mori
2005
Tampa Bay Devil Rays $
1,000,000
2 $
1,300,000 $
2,300,000
43.48%
Daisuke Matsuzaka
2006
Boston Red Sox
$
51,111,111
6 $
52,000,000 $
103,111,111
49.57%
Akinori Iwamura
2006
Tampa Bay Devil Rays $
4,500,000
3 $
7,700,000 $
12,200,000
36.89%
Kei Igawa
2006
New York Yankees
$
26,000,194
5 $
20,000,000 $
46,000,194
56.52%
Tsuyoshi Nishioka
2010
Minnesota Twins
$
5,329,000
3 $
9,250,000 $
14,579,000
36.55%
Norichika Aoki
2011
Milwaukee Brewers
$
2,500,000
2 $
2,500,000 $
5,000,000
50.00%
Yu Darvish
2011
Texas Rangers
$
51,700,000
6 $
60,000,000 $
111,700,000
46.28%
Version 2: Fee Determined by NPB Team with a Maximum of $20,000,000 and Players' Ability to Negotiate with Any MLB Team
Masahiro Tanaka
2013
New York Yankees
$
20,000,000
7 $
155,000,000 $
175,000,000
11.43%
Kenta Maeda
2015
Los Angeles Dodgers
$
20,000,000
8 $
25,000,000 $
45,000,000
44.44%
Shohei Ohtani*
2017
Los Angeles Angels
$
20,000,000
5 $
12,269,259 $
32,269,259
61.98%
Kazuhisa Makita
2017
San Diego Padres
$
500,000
2 $
3,800,000 $
4,300,000
11.63%
Version 3: Most Recent Agreement Implemented with Fee as a Percentage of Signed Contract
Yusei Kikuchi
2018
Seattle Mariners
$
10,275,000
4 $
56,000,000 $
66,275,000
15.50%
Yoshitomo Tsutsugo
2019
Tampa Bay Rays
$
2,400,000
4 $
12,000,000 $
14,400,000
16.67%
Shun Yamaguchi
2019
Toronto Blue Jays
$
1,200,000
2 $
6,000,000 $
7,200,000
16.67%
Kohei Arihara
2020
Texas Rangers
$
1,240,000
2 $
6,200,000 $
7,440,000
16.67%
*At the time of his posting, Shohei Ohtani was under 25 years old and therefore subject to the MLB CBA’s international signing rules, which limited him to the rookie
salary scale and a capped signing bonus. After three years, in his first year of arbitration, he agreed to a 2-year, $8.5 million contract. So, the size of his contract in this
chart was calculated using the sum of his guaranteed earnings, including his signing bonus, over the 5-year duration of the contracts (2017 – 2021).

Figure 7. Scatterplot of Decreasing Fees as a Percentage of the Total Cost for an MLB Team to
Acquire a Player

Posting Fee as a Percentage of Total Cost for MLB Team to
Acquire Player through the Posting System
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Figure 8. Table of NPB Parent Companies
Team

League Parent Company/Owner

Primary Industry/Type of Business

Chunichi Dragons

Central Chunichi Shimbun Co., Ltd.

Newspaper

Hanshin Tigers

Central Hanshin Electric Railway Co., Ltd.

Rail Transit

Hiroshima Toyo Carp

Central Matsuda Family/Mazda Motor Corporation Automotive Manufacturing

Tokyo Yakult Swallows

Central Yakult Honsha Co., Ltd.

Food, Beverage, and Pharmecuticals
(Yogurt/Probiotic Drinks)

Yokohama DeNA BayStars

Central DeNA Co., Ltd.

Mobile Provider, E-commerce

Yomiuri Giants

Central Yomiuri Shimbun

Newspaper

Chiba Lotte Marines

Pacific

Lotte Corporation

Food, Beverage, and Confections

Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks

Pacific

SoftBank Group Corp.

Telecommunications, Technology, Financial
Services

Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters Pacific

NH Foods Ltd.

Food Processing, Meat Packing

Orix Buffalos

Pacific

ORIX Corporation

Financial Services

Saitama Seibu Lions

Pacific

Seibu Railway Company, Ltd.

Rail Transit

Rakuten Group, Inc.

E-commerce

Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles Pacific

Figure 9. Table of NPB Teams with TrackMan Installed in Stadium

Team

League Stadium

Has TrackMan?

First Instance of
TrackMan Installation
(Month-Year)

Chunichi Dragons

Central Valetin Dome Nagoya

Yes

March-18

Hanshin Tigers

Central Hanshin Koshien Stadium

No Evidence

N/A

Hiroshima Toyo Carp

Central MAZDA Zoom-Zoom Stadium Hiroshima No Evidence

N/A

Tokyo Yakult Swallows

Central Meiji Jingu Stadium

Yes

March-18

Yokohama DeNA BayStars

Central Yokohama Stadium

Yes

October-19

Yomiuri Giants

Central Tokyo Dome

Yes

July-17

Chiba Lotte Marines

Pacific ZOZO Marine Stadium

No Evidence

N/A

Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks

Pacific Fukuoka PayPay Dome

Yes

April-17

Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters Pacific Sapporo Dome

Yes

October-16

Orix Buffalos

Pacific Kyocera Dome Osaka

Yes

August-16

Saitama Seibu Lions

Pacific MetLife Dome

Yes

December-16

Yes

April-17

Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles Pacific Rakuten Seimei Park Miyagi
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Figure 9A1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Valentin Dome Nagoya (Earliest Found
Occurrence) – by Matsuura Yuichi (March 2018)

Figure 9A2. TrackMan in Valentin Dome Nagoya Confirmation – by よしくん (April 2019)
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Figure 9B1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Meiji Jingu Stadium (Earliest Found Occurrence) –
by Y K (March 2018)
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Figure 9B2. TrackMan in Meiji Jingu Stadium Confirmation – by Russell Mahoney (July 2018)
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Figure 9C1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Yokohama Stadium (Earliest Found Occurrence) –
by Shingeru Sanada (July 2018)

Figure 9C2. TrackMan in Yokohama Stadium Confirmation – by ブリッジ BRIDDI Co. Ltd.
(September 2019)
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Figure 9D1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Tokyo Dome (Earliest Found Occurrence) – by
Halee Pagel (July 2017)

Figure 9D2. TrackMan in Tokyo Dome Confirmation – by Zack Hample (March 2019)
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Figure 9E. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Fukuoka PayPay Dome (Only Found Occurrence) –
by 石江千成 (April 2017)

Figure 9F. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Sapporo Dome (Only Found Occurrence) – by
Kousakushima (October 2016)
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Figure 9G. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Kyocera Dome Osaka (Only Found Occurrence) –
by Na Hi (August 2016)
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Figure 9H1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in MetLife Dome (Earliest Found Occurrence) – by
KAMING CO., LTD. (December 2016)

Figure 9H2. TrackMan in MetLife Dome Confirmation – by KAMING CO., LTD. (April 2019)
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Figure 9I. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Rakuten Seimei Park Miyagi (Only Found
Occurrence) – by Trip Inc. (April 2017)
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Figure 10. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Tama Home Stadium (Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks
Farm Base) – by 冨田茂 (September 2016)

Figure 11. YouTube Video of Takuya Nakashima 12-pitch At-Bat (Link)
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